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This paper analyzes the impact of mining taxation on the intertemporal extraction profile for a 
heterogeneous ore body. The extraction profile specifies both quantities and qualities extracted 
in each period. Total extraction is thus endogenously determined. The taxes explicitly considered 
are severance taxes (ad valorem or per unit; on metal or on ore), property taxes, and profits 
taxes (with depletion allowance). The intertemporal framework integrates economic and 
geological factors, generating new results on extraction distortions and providing qualification or 
reconciliation of previous diverse results in this area. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we examine some central issues of mineral resource taxation 
policy. Specifically, we analyze the impact of each of the several major taxes 
on (i) the timing of extraction with respect to quality, (ii) the rate of 
extraction, (iii) the total quantity of resource extracted, and (iv) the 
effectiveness of the tax in collecting resource rents. These are all issues that 
have been investigated to various degrees and in various contexts, with a 
diversity of conclusions corresponding to the diversity of premises. As 
described in more detail below, our model contains some new features, 
leading to some new results, while having a basic structure that permits a 
reconciliation or qualification of previous results. 
We are concerned with taxes that are applied selectively, i.e. within 
particular political jurisdictions and, possibly, to particular minera1s.l Only 
in exceptional circumstances will a change in a regional tax rate affect 
*The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy. 
‘See Gillis (1977), Stinson (1977) and Conrad (1979b) for a description of various taxes used 
in the United States, and Gillis et al. (1977) for a description of mining taxes in several other 
countries. 
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significantly the market price of the resource.’ It is therefore appropriate to 
consider the impact of these taxes on a price-taking firm. The assumption of 
price exogeneity is further justified by the irregularity of actual price paths 
for minerals (see footnote 6). 
The focus on the firm is also advantageous in allowing for more explicit 
modelling of geological factors. The mining problem is distinguished above 
all by these factors. Differences in the composition of the ore bodies cause 
differences in response to a given economic change. In part because of this, 
mineral tax policy in some countries has been negotiated on a mine-by-mine 
basis. Geological features must therefore be an essential part of any model 
that is to be used for policy or empirical analysis3 We emphasize here the 
grade distribution and the economic, as opposed to physical, quantity of 
reserves. This quantity, measured relative to a standard quality unit, is 
endogenous, not exogenous (as usually assumed in the literature), except in 
the very longest of long runs. With regard to any given mine, therefore, taxes 
will in general affect the size of economically recoverable reserves and the life 
of the mine, as well as the intertemporal extraction profile. 
As an illustration of the diversity of assumptions and conclusions in the 
literature on mineral economics, consider the investigations of the 
distortionary effects of a severance tax. In his seminal work, Hotelling (1931) 
showed that a severance tax (either ad valorem or per unit) causes industry 
extraction to be reallocated to later periods. This conclusion was also derived 
by Peterson (1976). Both assume that the tax is on the output of finished 
metal and that the stock is exogenously determined. Using a model of the 
firm, with an exogenous reserve, McDonald (1965) argues that the 
reallocation can be in either direction. Burness (1976) reaches a similar 
conclusion, again assuming an exogenous reserve, and argues also that the 
life of the mine will be unaffected. In further contrast, a number of writers 
have argued that output taxes affect the level of reserves and the life of the 
mine. This phenomenon of tax-induced ‘high-grading’ has been analyzed by 
Lockner (1965), Steele (1967), Laing (1976) Gillis et al. (1977) Gillis (1978) 
and Conrad (1978a). 
What will be shown here is, first of all, how and why both the life of the 
mine and the intertemporal extraction profile may be affected by such taxes. 
These results, and the precise nature of the distortions, reflect the empirical 
fact that ore bodies are not homogeneous with respect to quality. Higher 
quality ore may be exhausted and accrue rent, while lower quality ore may 
be left behind. Tax policy will thus affect both the rents on higher quality 
ores and the quantity of ore extracted. It will also be demonstrated that the 
‘See Gillis (1977) and Shelton and Morgan (1977) for a description of the conditions for 
shifting taxes forward. 
3Peterson and Fisher (1977) review the recent literature on the economics of extractive 
resources and note the importance of increasing the geological content in economic models. 
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effects of a severance tax will generally differ according to whether it is 
imposed on ore (at the mouth of the mine) or on concentrate (at the time of 
sale) and according to whether it is ad valorem or per unit. 
In section 2 we describe the basic model without taxes and obtain a 
characterization of the extraction profile. This will be the reference point for 
distortions caused by the introduction of taxes. In section 3 we analyze the 
impacts of several taxes frequently imposed on mining operations. 
Implications for policy are summarized in section 4. 
2. The model 
The firm’s objective is taken to be the maximization of present value of 
profits from extraction over an arbitrary planning horizon, subject to 
constraints imposed by the technology and resource availability. The firm is 
assumed to know the quality distribution of the ore body, i.e. the tonnage of 
each grade of ore. It must choose the quality and quantity of ore to be 
extracted in each period of time. 
Extraction costs in each period will depend on the total throughput of ore 
in that period, but not on the quality of ore extracted. The latter will 
determine the quantity of (final) output obtained from a given quantity of 
ore, output being defined as metal or ‘concentrate’ of a given purity. So, if 
Xtg is the quantity of ore of grade g (g= 1,. . ., G, in order of decreasing 
quality) extracted in period t (t = 1,. . ., T), the extraction cost in period t is 
C, (X,), where X, = c,“= i X,, and with C; > 0, C;, 2 0. The output in period t is 
I,“= i u9XtS, where ag is the proportion of metal in ore of grade g.4 
The firm’s decision problem is 
T 
max 2 
1 
(X,2 f=l (l+rY’ [ 
Pt : c$X,,-C,(X,) 
g=l 1 >, (1) 
subject to 
Rg2 i x,g, g=l,...,G, 
t=1 
xtg 2 0, t=l ,..., IT; g=l,..., G: 
where pr is the market price of output in period t (usually an expectation if 
4For example, if ore is 50% metal and concentrate is SOY”, then a,=0.625. For examples of 
grade variation models with endogenous reserves see Thomas (1976) Walduck (1976) and 
Conrad (1978a). Concentrate and final output will be used synonymously in the text. For a 
description of the two stages involved in the mining process see Gillis et al. (1978) and Conrad 
(1979a). 
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r> l), R, is the total tonnage of ore of grade g physically available, and r is 
the interest rate used by the firm (which may incorporate a risk factor).5 
The optimal extraction profile is determined by the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions for (1). Letting 9 denote the Lagrangian of (1) with A, the 
shadow price of reserves of grade g, these conditions are 
y, =PtRg - Cl(Xt) 
x~g (l+r)‘-’ -&SO, x,,zo, Xt$k,,=O, 
t=l,..., IT: g=l,...,G, (2) 
and 
2’ig=Rg- ; X,,zO, As 2 0, A,L2y,= (3) 
The following selection rule is from these 
Suppose of grade (respectively, is extracted period t, 
(respectively, t2). Then 
So %I’%, implies ~,,/(l+r)“~p,,/(l+r)‘~ and, conversely, ~,,/(l+r)” 
>p,,/(l +r)‘l implies ~~~~~~~~ the grade selection profile corresponds to the 
profile of discounted prices. The firm wants to take the highest grade of ore 
when the discounted prices are greatest; lower grades will be sequentially 
allocated in like manner until further extraction is no longer profitable.‘j The 
reason that costs do not appear in (4) is that they are a function of the 
quantity of ore processed in the given period, independent of the grade. 
Costs do, however, affect the quantity of ore processed and the lowest grade 
taken in any period. 
It is also clear from (2) that it is possible (and indeed empirically likely) 
that some lower grades of ore will not be extracted; that is, there will be a g* 
with X,,,>O in some period t* 5 7; and &*=O, so that 
G*W,*) 
c$*= (5) 
Pt* 
‘For examples of how risks are evaluated see Bennett et al. (1970). 
%chulze (1974). Herfindahl (1967) and Hartwick (1978) discuss rules where high grades are 
always taken first. In their models prices are assumed to be rising at a rate not greater than the 
rate of interest. However, in fact, prices vary substantially from period to period. For instance, 
the price of cobalt rose 253 %, lead 87 %, plutonium 159 %, and copper 47 y0 between June 1978 
and June 1979 (see Business Week, July 2, 1979, p. 50). 
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This g* is the ‘cut-off’ grade in the current model and is analogous to that 
found frequently in the mining engineering literature.7 The firm reaches the 
profitability margin while extracting ore of grade g* and will not extract ore 
of lower grades. This cut-off condition determines the aggregate quantity of 
reserves extracted and, together with the period rates of extraction, the life of 
the mine. 
Note that it is not generally the case that the mine is closed at the time the 
cut-off grade is extracted. Condition (5) determines total extraction and thus 
capacity utilization in period t *. But if t* < T then, by the very nature of the 
determination of the grade selection profile, the discounted price in period 
t* + 1 is higher and at that time a grade of ore higher than g* will be 
extracted. 
3. The effects of taxation 
The introduction of taxes will modify the objective function in (1) in ways 
that vary according to the type of tax. Discrete changes in the tax 
parameters (in particular, a jump from zero to some positive number 
corresponding to the introduction of a tax) may bring about a change in the 
grade selection profile, affecting also the cut-off grade. The intertemporal 
allocation of grades in the presence of taxes is determined by a relationship 
analogous to (4), with the relevant ‘price’ being the effective net-of-tax price 
of output. 
Marginal changes in the tax parameters will not, except in boundary cases, 
alter the quality profile. But they can affect the quantity of ore extracted in 
any given period, this quantity response depending not only on prices and 
costs, but also on the nature of the intertemporal allocation prevailing prior 
to the tax change. In view of the numerous possible initial situations, the 
quantity responses will be illustrated in a two-period, two-grade context.’ 
For the same reason, it will be further assumed for this part of the analysis 
that the discounted ‘effective’ price is higher in the first period, so that the 
higher grade of ore is taken first. The results for the cases of constant or 
rising discounted effective price can be easily inferred. Indeed, the qualitative 
character of the quantity distortions will not depend on the path of prices 
‘For a discussion of cut-off grades from the engineering perspective see Thomas (1973) and 
Lane (1964). Lane notes that the cut-off grade is a function of several factors and is more 
complicated than (5). However, (5) yields a convenient summary measure used in the industry’ 
that we can adopt for our purposes. It should also be noted that the planning horizon may be 
reduced because of risk and the use of such factors as pay-back periods. The lowest.grade of ore 
planned to be extracted may therefore exceed the cut-off grade given by (5). See Bennett et al. 
(1970) for discussion. 
*The use of two-period models to demonstrate the effects of dynamic processes is well 
established in the economics literature. It does not impose any significant restriction in the 
present context. 
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except for two of the tax variants we consider. These exceptions will be 
emphasized as they occur. 
Even with the above simplifications and ignoring boundary cases, there are 
eight possible extraction profiles, according to whether one or both grades 
are extracted in each period and to whether or not one or both of the 
resource constraints are binding (i.e. the corresponding grades scarce). We 
shall note the general principles involved in the reallocation, and confine 
specific illustration to the following two cases. 
Case 1. Grade 1 (high grade) ore is extracted in both periods, being 
exhausted in the second. Grade 2 (low grade) ore is extracted only in the 
second period, and exhausted. Both grades are therefore scarce. I.e., X,, >O, 
x,,=o, x,,>o, x,,>o; X,,+X,,=Ri(A,>O); X,,+X,,=R,(A,>O). 
Case 2. Grade 1 ore is extracted in both periods, exhausted in the second. 
Grade 2 ore is extracted only in the second period, and not exhausted. Only 
grade 1 is scarce. I.e., X,,>O, X1,=0, X,,>O, X,,>O; X,,+X,,=R, 
(&>O); X,,+X,,<R,(&=O). 
Consideration of these cases will be sufficient to demonstrate both the 
intertemporal distortions and the tax-induced high-grading effects.’ 
We now analyze in turn the allocative effects of severance taxes (including 
royalties), property taxes and proportional profits taxes with depletion 
allowances. In each case it will be assumed that the tax is to be applied at 
the same rate (or nominal value, as appropriate) in all periods. 
3.1. Severance tuxes 
Severance taxes imposed on mining operations are generally of three types: 
(a) a fixed payment per ton of metal, (b) a fixed payment per ton of ore 
extracted, and (c) a proportion of the metal price, in which case the tax is 
often termed a royalty. Severance taxes have developed to replace property 
taxes on account of the relative ease of their administration [see Lockner 
(1965)J 
It was noted in the introduction that previous analysis has produced an 
assortment of results on the allocative effects of these taxes. Further, Boyle 
(1977) has argued that such taxes can be used to collect rent accruing to 
extraction of the scarce resource. Below, it will be shown how the impacts of 
a severance tax will depend on the variant used and on the prevailing 
context of economic and geological conditions. 
‘Results for the other cases as well as derivations are contained in a longer paper, available 
from the authors. 
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3.1.1. Per unit tax on output 
This form of severance tax is a fixed nominal charge (7 >O) per ton of 
output. With it, the firm’s profit in period t is 
%=(P,-7) ; aqx,q-CtW,). 
q=l 
(6) 
Note that the only effect on problem (1) is the replacement of pr by pt -7. 
The grade selection (condition (4)) is now characterized in terms of this 
effective price, pt - 7: 
Consequently, there will be no grade selection distortion” provided that 
(~,,-7)/(l+r)“>(p,z-7)/(1+r)‘2wheneverp,1/(1+r)“>p,~/(l+r)’Z.This will 
always be the case if t, > t, (i.e. if prices are rising at a rate greater than the rate of 
interest) since then 7/(1 +r)f’>s/(l + ry2. However, if tl <t, (i.e. if discounted 
prices are falling) it is possible that the lower discounted tax in a later period 
may now more than compensate for the lower discounted price, inducing the 
firm to postpone extraction of the higher grade ore. The tax rate sufficient to 
bring about this reversal is lower the smaller is the amount by which the 
firm’s interest rate exceeds the expected rate of inflation of metal prices in the 
short run. In the particular case where prices are rising at the rate of interest, 
so that in the absence of the tax the firm would be indifferent about the 
timing of extraction, introduction of the tax will definitely cause 
postponement of high-grade extraction. (If the interest rate were less than the 
anticipated rate of price inflation, the firm would already have been 
postponing high-grade extraction.) On the other hand, the cut-off grade is 
now given by 
c; 
CXq*= 
Pt-7’ 
and so may be greater than in (5). Empirical confirmation of such increases 
in the cut-off grade (tax-induced ‘high-grading’) has been made, for example, 
“We shall say that there is no grade selection distortion if the ordering of time periods 
according to (4) is the same before and after the imposition of the tax. Of course, any quantity 
changes induced by the tax will in general change the time periods in which any particular grade 
is planned to be extracted, i.e. even if the ordering of periods according to (4) is unchanged, the 
association of time periods with qualities of ore extracted will change. 
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in Bolivia [see Gillis et al. (1977)], where mines have been closed 
premature1y.l’ 
The general features of the response to an increase in this tax are as 
follows. 
(i) If a grade of ore would have been exhausted had there not been a tax 
increase, t,his will continue to be so, i.e. the total quantity extracted of that 
grade will not be affected by a marginal change. 
(ii) However, if a grade is being extracted in more than one period, 
whether ultimately exhausted or not, there will be a quantity reallocation 
from present to future. An increase in the tax reduces the marginal revenue 
(effective price) in each period, but this reduction is greater in the first period 
than in the second because the same nominal change is being discounted in 
the second. 
(iii) If some grade is not being exhausted there will be a reduction in the 
extraction of that grade, this being governed by the condition that marginal 
cost be equal to the net-of-tax price. This will be accompanied by the 
reallocation from present to future, described in (ii), of any grade being 
extracted in both periods. Total extraction, and hence output, is therefore 
reduced whenever some grade is not viewed by the firm as scarce in an 
economic sense. 
(iv) The shadow prices of scarce grades, measuring the present value of 
profit from an additional unit, are reduced, by more for higher grades than 
for lower. The reason for the relative difference is that a given tax on metal 
means a higher tax per ton of higher grade ore. 
These principles are not affected by the assumption that the discounted 
effective price is falling over time. The details of the adjustments in the 
representative situations will now be described. The corresponding 
derivatives are presented in table 1. 
In case 1 the reserves of both grades are binding constraints. Total 
extraction will therefore not change. However, extraction of the high grade in 
period 1 will fall, i.e. the rate of extraction will be reduced, with a 
corresponding reallocation to period 2. In case 2, where the low grade is not 
fully extracted, extraction becomes less profitable at the margin and is 
therefore cut back. With high-grade extraction being merely reallocated from 
present to future, total recovery will fall by the reduction in low-grade 
extraction. 
“Lockner (1965) notes that, as long as reserves are exogenous, a severance tax may lengthen 
the life of the mine by decreasing extraction each period and thus reducing costs. Such a 
phenomenon is not precluded a priori in the present model. But for it to occur the fall in 
marginal costs would have to exactly equal the increase in the tax, implying no change in the 
scarcity price of reserves. However, we show that the scarcity price is reduced, if anything, 
increasing the cut-off grade. 
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Table 1 
Output effects of a marginal change in the severance tax on output. 
Case 1 Case 2 
dx,, 
dz 
dx,, 
d? 
(1 +r)cc,C;‘+ (rq +ocz)C; 
<O (I + r)C;C; 
dA, 
ds 
- 
a,(C;+c;: 
<o _ 
(l+r)C;+Cz 
al -% 
-<o 
l+r 
-(l+r)a,C;-(rcc,+n,)C; 
<o n.a 
(lfr)((l+r)C;+C;) 
The value of grade 1 reserves will fall by more than that of grade 2 (which 
will be zero in case 2), although the former value must always exceed the 
latter. A tax increase of $1 per ton on metal of 80% purity, for example, 
translates to a $0.75 tax increase per ton of 60 % ore (a=0.6/0.8 =0.75) but 
only a $0.50 tax increase per ton of 40 % ore (CX =0.4/0.8 =OSO). 
It is also worth noting that, aside from the possible quality profile effects 
noted before, continued increases in the tax would eventually transform a 
case 1 situation into case 2, and so on, until ultimately, if the tax were 
sufficiently high, the mine would be closed. Thus, instead of serving only to 
collect resource rents, severance taxes may reduce the size of economically 
recoverable reserves. Only in a situation where each grade of ore is extracted 
and exhausted within a given period will a marginal tax change have no 
distortionary effects, i.e. have only a pure (lump sum) rental effect. 
3.1.2. Per unit tax on ore 
This severance tax is on ore as it is extracted from the mine, before 
processing, independent of the grade. l2 Because of ore quality differences, its 
impacts are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those of a tax on 
output. 
“Most ores, even coal, are processed at the mine site before being transported. Thus the tax 
on ore is actually a tax on an input into the processing operation. See Gillis et al. (1978) for a 
description. 
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The firm’s after-tax profit in period t will be 
G 
7 = Pt 1 agx,, - c, (X,) - TX,, 
g=l 
(7) 
where 7 now denotes the tax per unit of ore. Unlike the tax on output, which 
effectively reduces the output price, this tax amounts to a uniform upward 
shift in the firm’s marginal cost curve. 
Since the effective price of output is not changed, the relationship (4) is 
unaffected and so there is no distortion of the grade selection profile. 
However, the magnitudes of the quantity distortions are increased when the 
tax is on ore rather than metal and is thus partially a tax on wasted 
material. 
The cut-off grade, g*, is now given by 
ag*- 
c;+z 
9 
PC 
whereby the tax is seen to induce a tendency toward high-grading. In terms 
of (7), the effect of the difference in the location of the tax can be regarded 
alternatively as a decline in the value of ore of grade g (before extraction 
costs) in period t, from ptccs -mg to ptag --z. In the expressions for rates of 
change with respect to the tax, the derivatives being all of the same form as 
in table 1, the as’s are correspondingly replaced by 1’s. A unit tax on ore is, 
for any grade less than 1000/o, greater than a unit tax on metal and is 
proportionately greater for lower grades of ore. 
3.1.3. Ad valorem severance tax 
This severance tax is a proportion fi (assumed fixed, less than 1) of the 
output price. After-tax profit in period t is then 
The effect of the tax is to reduce the effective output price in period t from pt 
to (1 -/?)p,. It is clear from (4) that the imposition of the tax will therefore 
not affect the order in which grades are extracted. However, the cut-off grade 
is now given by 
c; 
Q+=(l-p)p,’ 
so there may be a reduction in economic reserves. 
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The quantity distortions induced by an ad valorem tax differ from those of 
the per unit output tax. Because the size of the ad valorem tax varies with 
the output price, its effects will depend on the path of discounted prices. In 
particular, the intertemporal reallocation of a scarce grade, always from 
present to future with the per unit tax, will now be in the direction of the 
period with the lower discounted market price. The reduction in effective 
output price due to an increase in the royalty rate is less when the market 
price is less. 
These comparative static effects are given in table 2 for the two illustrative 
cases. Note that in case 1 there is a pure reallocation of grade 1 in favor of 
period 2, which has the lower discounted price. There would have been no 
impact if prices had been rising at the rate of interest, an impact in the 
reverse direction (i.e. toward period 1) if prices had been rising faster than 
the rate of interest. In view of the varied patterns of actual mineral prices it 
is clear that the response to an increase in the royalty rate will not be 
uniform, either over time or across minerals. 
A comparison of the three types of severance taxes shows that only the ad 
valorem tax may produce a distortion in either direction. The result of 
McDonald (1965) and Burness (1976) that severance taxes have this 
ambiguous effect, does not apply to the per unit taxes. 
3.1.4. A note on variable severance taxes 
It has been shown by Peterson (1976) and Burness (1976) that, with an 
exogenously determined reserve base, an output tax that rises at the rate of 
interest will be non-distortionary. Such a tax creates the obvious practical 
difficulty of determining the proper discount rate. But it may also have 
distortionary effects, not examined by the preceding authors, when economic 
reserves are endogenous. 
Consider, for instance, the effect on the cut-off grade. With a per unit 
severance tax, the cut-off grade is given by 
c1 
c; 
Pr-z(l +r)” 
while for an ad valorem tax it is given by 
c: 
c(g*=pt[l -a;1 +r)‘,’ 
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The cut-off grade is increased in either case. Also, for reasons discussed 
above, the grade selection profile may now be distorted by an ad valorem 
royalty, as well as by a per m&output tax. 
Similar distortions will be induced by other forms of variable severance tax 
that have been adopted, such as those which vary with the consumer or 
wholesale price index, or with the market price of the mineral.13 
3.2. Property taxes 
Property taxes cause a tendency to shift extraction from future to present 
and are thus, ceteris paribus, detrimental to conservation.‘4 This result has 
been established in the literature and follows also from the present model. 
Once again, however, property taxes have some associated distortions that 
have not been noted and that may be significant in off-setting the effects of 
the forward-shifting tendency. 
Suppose that the tax rate and the estimated value per ton of metal are 
constant, and that the tax in any period is imposed on the reserves 
remaining at the end of the period. The tax paid at the end of period t is 
therefore 
where 8>0 is the tax rate (incorporating the constant estimate of metal 
value). After-tax profit in period is then, apart from a constant term, 
lrL,= [ pr+e 2 1 j=t (l+,~-’ 1 ii: a$,, - c(X, b.g=1 
It is clear from (9) that for each ton of ore extracted in any period, the 
firm saves the present value of future tax payments. This results in an 
increase in the net-of-tax price in the period of extraction, i.e. it is in effect a 
negative per-unit severance tax whose value changes from period to period. 
The direction of the tax-induced distortions are accordingly the opposite of 
those reported in 3.1.1; the tax will encourage extraction of higher grades in 
the early periods. But it is also the case that the cut-off grade is lowered. This 
is an important consideration since it is known that in many instances the 
13For instance, New Mexico’s coal severance tax is a function of the consumer price index, 
while North Dakota’s oil severance tax is a function of the wholesale price index. See Conrad 
(1979b) for details. 
‘%ee Stinson (1977) and Peterson (1976) for discussion. 
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quantity of ore increases as the grade decreases.15 The increase in economic 
reserves of the mine may be sufficient to offset the reallocation of extraction 
to the present, and thus increase the life of the mine, The net effect will 
depend upon the grade-tonnage distribution of the particular deposit, but it 
is an effect that certainly should not be ignored in planning tax policy. 
It is worth emphasizing that, since the taxable body of ore is not fixed but 
rather depends on the extraction decision, a property tax is not a lump sum 
tax on the mine. However, a lump sum tax could be achieved with a 
combination of suitably chosen property and severance taxes, for example, in 
view of their qualitatively opposite distortionary effects. 
3.3. Proportional profits taxes with depletion allowances’6 
It is well established that pure profits taxes without depletion allowances 
are non-distortionary. That the introduction of depletion allowances tends to 
increase the rate of extraction in the early periods is equally well 
documented.17 However, as in the case of property taxes, there are additional 
effects that have been ignored in the literature. 
For present purposes cost depletion is defined as a fixed dollar allowance d 
per ton of final output produced. If the profits tax rate is k, the after-tax 
profit in period t is then 
PC 2 m&q-C,V,)-k it ? usX,,-C,(X,)-d ? x,X,g 
g=1 g= 1 g= 1 1 
The depletion allowance is seen to effectively raise the output price by a 
constant amount, kd/l -k, when profits are positive. It therefore operates as 
a negative per-unit severance tax, or ‘severance subsidy’. The combined effects 
of tax and allowance are consequently the opposite of those reported in 
3.1.1. As with a property tax, the cut-off grade is increased and so there may 
be an increase in the life of the mine, depending on the grade-tonnage 
distribution. 
“See Brooks (1976) and the references in that paper for a discussion of the grade-tonnage 
relationship. 
‘%ates have begun imposing progressive profits taxes as well. For an analysis of this tax see 
Conrad and Ho01 (1979b). 
“Depletion allowances are the most studied incentive in the mining industry. Peterson (1976) 
and Sweeney (1977) show that depletion allowances tend to reallocate extraction to the present. 
Others, including Harberger (1955), Steiner (1959, 1968) and McDonald (1961, 1967, 1976) 
concentrate on the allocative distortions of percentage depletion. 
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Percentage depletion, on the other hand, is a fixed proportion h of the 
current value of output. In this case, after-tax profit in period t is 
pt 5 a,&,-C,(x,)-k pt 5 NgXtg-Ct(X,)-4-s .f. agxtg 
g=l g=1 g=l 1 
When profits are positive the allowance effectively increases the price per ton 
by a factor kh/l- k and therefore operates as a negative ad valorem 
severance tax.18 The effects of the allowance are then the opposite of those 
reported in 3.1.3. In addition to decreasing the cut-off grade and increasing 
reserves, the allowance may or may not defer extraction, depending on the 
path of discounted prices. Thus, in periods of rapidly increasing prices, such 
an allowance may be an additional incentive to conserve the resource which 
has not been previously noted. 
4. Summary 
The results of this investigation are summarized in table 3. They offer a 
synthesis of previous work as well as new insights into the effects of tax 
Table 3 
Summary of effects of taxes on mining decisions. 
Tax 
Grade selection 
profile 
Reserves 
(high-grading effects) Extraction profile 
Per unit severance on 
output 
Per unit severance on 
ore 
Ad valorem severance 
Profits tax with 
cost depletion 
Profits tax with 
percentage depletion 
Property tax 
Present to future Decreased Present to future 
None 
None 
Decreased 
Decreased 
Present to future 
Depends on path 
of discounted prices 
Future to present Increased Future to present 
None Increased Depends on path 
of discounted prices 
Future to present Increased Future to present 
“The fact that percentage depletion is a negative severance tax has been noted by Davidson 
(1963, 1970) and Hause (1963). 
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policy on mining firms. Each tax (subsidy) has been shown to have the 
potential for inducing distortions in the intertemporal allocation of reserves 
and the economically recoverable reserve base. The results are based on the 
fact that reserves are not homogeneous, and that any one mine is planned to 
have a finite life’. Ore which is extracted and exhausted does accrue rents, 
and thus a tax may distort the extraction profile of these ores. On the other 
hand, the size of the deposit is endogenous at this level and a tax may well 
affect the life of the mine and the total reserves extracted. 
The effect that a particular tax will have in an actual situation will depend 
on the price-cost profile and the geological composition of the ore body. For 
instance, a severance tax imposed on a porphyry copper deposit, where the 
ore is evenly distributed and marginal costs are constant to capacity, would 
only affect the later years of production. The same tax imposed on a small 
silver deposit, where the variance in grades is high and marginal costs are 
increasing, may force the mine to close prematurely. 
A number of empirical questions are suggested. First, how much ‘high- 
grading’ is induced by these taxes for different types of deposits? Second, do 
property taxes and depletion allowances significantly lengthen or shorten the 
life of the mine? Third, can states or countries with marginal deposits use tax 
policy to compete effectively for mineral investments? Fourth, to what degree 
can states or countries with large reserves collect substantial taxes without 
significantly affecting investment? Finally, given that reserves of any mine are 
endogenous, is there a combination of taxes which will cause a minimum of 
distortions yet require acceptable administration procedures and costs? 
These are all questions that warrant further research. 
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